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“For I Was a Stranger and You Welcomed Me In”: Explaining White Evangelical 
Attitudes Toward Immigrants and Refugees 
Joy Girgis 
Dr. Kerem Kalkan, Department of Government 
 
White evangelical Christians in the United States are a population that plays a vital role 
in political influence. Data supports the assertion that a significant number of white 
evangelicals in America harbor negative attitudes toward immigrants, refugees, or the 
perceived “other.” A contradiction then arises between the political attitudes of white 
evangelicals toward migrant groups and the main tenants of the faith that evangelicals so 
firmly proclaim, such as compassion, justice, and love. This thesis will specifically seek 
to answer the question what explains white evangelical attitudes toward immigrants and 
refugees? This research utilizes a cross tab analysis consisting of data from the Pew 
Research Center to support the hypothesis that the stronger a white evangelical identifies 
with their white identity, the more likely they are to oppose immigrants and refugees. 
This research contributes new findings to the existing literature on white evangelical 
political behavior by arguing that the very faith they so strongly proclaim directly 
contradicts their political attitudes. Rather than letting love, compassion, and the 
teachings of Jesus motivate their political views, the data reveals that racial perspectives 
represent a much stronger predictor.  
  
Keywords: Evangelicals, Immigrants, Refugees, White Identity, White Privilege, Racism, 
Christianity, Politics, Trump 
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 The relationship that exists between religious affiliation and political attitudes in 
the United States is both complex and inextricable. Level of religiosity is often times the 
greatest predictor of what an individual’s political views are going to be. Evangelical 
Christians in particular make up a significant portion of America’s population, and 
therefore maintain a significant amount of influence in the country’s political arena. 
According to a study done by Pew Research Center, 25.4% of Americans identified 
themselves as evangelical protestants in 2014, the largest percentage of any other 
religious affiliation (Pew Research Center 2015). Complexities occur when the political 
attitudes of these religious individuals do not align with the main doctrine and teachings 
of their particular faith. While this complexity has existed throughout political history, it 
has never made itself more clear than during the political activity that has occurred 
between 2016 and now. 
 The 2016 presidential election reached new heights of polarization and brought 
with it a new age of political chaos. Twitter politics, personal attacks, and outwardly 
racist rhetoric are all elements that were carried into the administration by Donald Trump 
when he was elected as president. During his campaign, he made immigration and 
refugee intake central issues by “proposing to step up deportation of undocumented 
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immigrants, construct a wall on the southern border, and halt immigration from Muslim 
nations” (Sherkat and Lehman 2018, 1792). The election of Trump as the 45th President 
of the United States was an unexpected outcome that shook the entire country, causing 
citizens and political scientists alike to question what led to his victory. In regard to 
public support, white evangelicals were one of the largest groups who overwhelmingly 
approved of Trump as a presidential candidate. A preliminary analysis of the 2016 
election showed that roughly 8 in 10, or 80%, of individuals who identify as white born-
again evangelicals voted for Trump (Martínez and Smith 2016). After assuming office, 
the Trump administration swiftly began implementing the severe policies and statements 
that he made during his campaign in regard to immigrants and refugees. For example, 
within the first month of his presidency, the administration implemented a travel ban on 
individuals from seven Muslim majority countries that prohibited them from entering the 
United States. Another example would be how the administration has remained publicly 
committed to its immigration plan of building a wall on the southern border between the 
United States and Mexico. An addition that has come with this plan is a heavier 
utilization of immigration officers to create a harsher crackdown on illegal immigration, 
leading to the family separations at the border that have been occurring since 2018. 
 The implementation and publicization of these policies have heavily contributed 
to the topics of immigrants and refugees being pushed to the forefront of contemporary 
political conversations. Despite the fact that a majority of these policies are broadcasted 
on a platform of xenophobia and racial stereotypes, white evangelicals continue to 
possess predominantly negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. Only 31 
percent of white evangelical protestants support allowing Syrian refugees into the 
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country, the lowest among any other religious group (Newman 2018). In a poll conducted 
by the Washington Post and ABC, 75 percent of white evangelical Christians rated “the 
federal crackdown on undocumented immigrants” as positive, compared with 46 percent 
of U.S. adults overall, and 25 percent of nonwhite Christians (Boorstein and Zauzmer 
2018). This thesis argues that there is a contradiction between the negative attitudes of 
white evangelicals toward immigrants and refugees and the main tenants of the faith to 
which they claim, such as love and justice (Schoenfeld 1974). The research question that 
this thesis will seek to answer is what explains white evangelical attitudes toward 
immigrants and refugees? Research on this topic is relevant due to the “virtual absence of 
religion in the literature” on immigrant and refugee attitudes (Knoll 2009, 313) and due 
to the societal significance of white evangelical political behavior. Previous studies will 
be reviewed in order to develop theories that can answer this paper’s research question, 
including anti-Obama sentiment, group identities, white racial solidarity, nationalism, 
white Christian nationalism, and class culture. 
Biblical Contradictions 
 The negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees that are commonly held by 
white evangelicals are a perplexing phenomenon because they directly contradict the 
main tenants of Christianity and Jesus’s teachings. Love, compassion, hospitality, and 
kindness towards others are repeatedly proclaimed in the Bible as foundational guidelines 
for how followers of Jesus should live their lives. The Bible even specifically mentions 
that these guidelines are to be applied to foreigners, the poor, and the oppressed within 
society (Heltzel 2009). Leviticus 19:33-34 proclaims, “33 When a foreigner resides among 
you in your land, do not mistreat them. 34 The foreigner residing among you must be 
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treated as your native-born. Love them as yourself, for you were foreigners in Egypt” 
(New International Version). Isaiah 10:1-2 states, “1Woe to those who make unjust laws, 
to those who issue oppressive decrees, 2 to deprive the poor of their rights and withhold 
justice from the oppressed of my people, making widows their prey and robbing the 
fatherless” (NIV). Colossians 3:12 also states, “therefore, as Gods chosen people, holy 
and dearly loved, clothe yourselves with compassion, kindness, humility, gentleness, and 
patience” (NIV). Not only does the Bible establish love and compassion as essential 
tenants of the Christian faith, but Jesus himself and the life he led provides the ultimate 
example of what Christians today are to be like. After his birth, Jesus himself was a 
refugee in the land of Egypt. Matthew 2:13 tells us that, “13 When they had gone, an angel 
of the Lord appeared to Joseph in a dream. ‘Get up,’ he said, ‘take the child and his 
mother and escape to Egypt. Stay there until I tell you, for Herod is going to search for 
the child to kill him’” (NIV). In the story where Jesus feeds the four thousand, Matthew 
15:32 tells us that “32 Jesus called his disciples to him and said, ‘I have compassion for 
these people; they have already been with me three days and have nothing to eat. I do not 
want to send them away hungry, or they may collapse on the way’” (NIV). Jesus’s life 
even provided multiple examples of being welcoming towards those who were often 
rejected by society, such as the story of Jesus accepting the tax collector (Luke 19:1-10), 
and the story of Jesus conversating with the Samaritan woman (John 4). 
Not Applicable to All 
 It is essential to recognize that not all members of the white evangelical 
community hold negative and contradictory attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. 
Several prominent protestant ministers and the National Association of Evangelicals 
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“have urged for less hostile treatment of immigrants and refugees” (Sherkat and Lehman 
2018, 1791). In October of 2018, evangelical leaders released a statement calling for 
comprehensive, compassionate immigration solutions. They wrote, “beyond the role of 
the government, we encourage churches to respond with Christ-like love to the 
vulnerable families and individuals who form this caravan” (Evangelical Immigration 
Table 2018). In August of 2018, leaders from the Evangelical Immigration Table sent a 
letter to the Trump administration to admit more refugees, “citing religious liberty and 
our history of offering safe haven to people fleeing religious persecution” (Evangelical 
Immigration Table 2018). In June of 2018, “delegates at the Southern Baptist 
Convention’s annual conferences passed a near-unanimous resolution affirming the 
dignity of migrants and refugees” (Burton 2018). Evangelical religious leaders are not the 
only individuals who have opposed the ever-growing negative attitudes and policies 
towards immigrants and refugees. Evangelical Christians of all races have formed 
organizations based on the premise that negative policies toward immigrants and refugees 
go against the teachings of Jesus. Red Letter Christians is an example of an organization 
that is based on that very premise. The mission of Red Letter Christians is to “stay true to 
the foundation of combining Jesus and justice by mobilizing individuals into a movement 
of believers who live out Jesus’ counter-cultural teachings” (Red Letter Christians). The 
organization does this through blogs, newsletters, podcasts, and gatherings. While various 
forms of progress towards justice have been made within the evangelical community, the 
data continues to show that on average, white evangelicals in the United States still have 
opposing attitudes towards immigrants, refugees, and the perceived “other.”  
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Who are Evangelical Protestants? 
 Before diving into a conversation on what motivates white evangelical political 
behavior, it is important to first define and describe what it means to be an evangelical 
protestant and the history of the tradition. As previously stated, evangelical protestants 
comprise “one of the most significant religious traditions in America” (Putnam and 
Campbell 2010). From America’s earliest days, white Protestants have “dominated 
American culture” (Clemmitt 2017, 4). Evangelicalism was the dominant form of 
American Protestantism throughout most of the nineteenth century, until the late 1800s 
and early 1900s when protestants split over a debate between modernists versus 
fundamentalists. Mainline protestants can be identified as descending from the modernist 
perspective, who today are more likely to emphasize the Social Gospel – “the belief that a 
Christian’s priority should be the reform of social institutions” – than personal piety 
(Putnam and Campbell 2010). Evangelical protestants today can be identified as 
descending from the more fundamentalist sect, which “held fast to a more traditional, and 
thus conservative interpretation of scripture” (Putnam and Campbell 2010). These are the 
roots of what modern day evangelical Protestantism has bloomed to be. 
 It is essential to gain an accurate understanding of what the characteristics are of 
modern American evangelical Protestants. Evangelical Protestantism can most commonly 
be identified by three main characteristics; the belief that the Bible is the true word of 
God, the belief that “salvation can only come from a personal relationship with Christ” 
(Tranby, Hartmann 2008, 343), and a dedication to spreading the faith to others. Wald 
and Calhoun-Brown (2018) also define evangelicals by “their certainty of God and the 
divine origins of the bible, the self-reported centrality of religion to their lives, and their 
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high rates of reading scripture, praying, and sharing their faith with people outside their 
own religion.” A religious landscape study done by the Pew Research Center revealed 
that 92% of evangelical protestants consider scripture the word of God (Wald and 
Calhoun-Brown 2018). Indeed, one of the most important parts of evangelical 
Protestantism is biblical literalism. This characteristic of evangelical Protestantism is one 
of the main areas where the beliefs and the political attitudes of those same believers 
contradict each other. If biblical literalism of certain scriptures is meant to be embraced, 
then it makes sense that the scriptures regarding compassion and welcoming the stranger 
should be embraced just as equally. 
 The political and social characteristics of American evangelicals are also vital to 
understanding the population as a whole. White evangelicals, on average, identify with 
the Republican party and are ideologically conservative. These individuals are sometimes 
categorized under the popular term the Christian Right, “a network of politically active 
organizations and individuals who consistently support certain conservative policies and 
aspire reassert the public moral authority of Christianity” (Clemmitt 2017, 4). This 
alliance between the Republican party and evangelicals began in the 1980s when 
conservative Christian leaders began offering to deliver votes in exchange for “the party’s 
support for Christian priorities, such as banning abortion” (Clemmitt 2017, 15). Thus was 
born the Christian Right, one of the most powerful alliances between a political party and 
a specific demographic group that continues to influence American politics today. The 
Religious Landscape Study done by the Pew Research Center revealed that 56% of non-
Black evangelical protestants identify with the Republican party, and 58% self-described 
themselves as politically conservative (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2018).  
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 As previously stated, roughly 80% of individuals who identify as white born-
again evangelicals voted for Trump in the 2016 election, an overwhelming majority. 
There are a number of reasons for why white evangelicals voted for Trump and for why 
they possess the political attitudes that they do. Frequency of church attendance and 
economic status are two indicators that are essential to understanding the political 
characteristics of white evangelicals. Trump performed stronger in the 2016 election 
among individuals who rarely attend church than among individuals who are frequent 
church goers. Political and religious literature shows that "evangelicals who attend 
church at least weekly (“frequent” attenders) have higher incomes and are more likely to 
have a college degree, compared with those who attend church infrequently (never, 
seldom, a few times a year, or once or twice a month)” (Layman 2016). Infrequent church 
attenders “cared less about the traditional Christian Right policy agenda and more about 
Trump’s agenda of creating jobs, improving Americans’ economic welfare, and 
stemming the tide on immigration” (Layman 2016). According to data from the 2016 
American National Election Survey (ANES), infrequent church attenders were less likely 
to prioritize moral and cultural issues such as abortion and cared much more about jobs 
and economic welfare (Layman 2016). Another characteristic of infrequent church 
attenders is the particular minority groups that they criticize. While the Christian Right 
“traditionally has focused criticism on groups such as feminists, gays, and lesbians,” 
Trump and his base of infrequent church goers have targeted religious and racial minority 
groups, such as Muslims, Hispanics, and Blacks (Layman 2016). Philip Gorski, a 
sociology professor at Yale University, has identified this particular base of white 
evangelicals as a symptom of Trumpism; “a reactionary and secularized version of white 
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Christian nationalism” (Gorski 2017). By understanding the history of American 
evangelical Protestantism, the beliefs of its members today, and the strong political 
associations among its followers, the foundation can be laid for a conversation on the 
attitudes of white evangelical protestants toward immigrants and refugees. 
Why White Evangelicals? 
 Readers may now be questioning why this thesis is racializing the topic of 
attitudes toward immigrants and refugees by focusing on white evangelicals in particular. 
Why not focus on all evangelicals as a whole? The reason why race is essential to a 
discussion on favorability towards immigrants and refugees is because race is inherently 
embedded in the formation of these attitudes. White evangelicals are the only 
demographic within the evangelical protestant faith who significantly oppose immigrants 
and refugees and conform to a culture of exclusionary policies when it comes to racial 
minorities.  
 American evangelicals are not by any means exclusively white. There is an 
increasing rate of Black and Latino evangelicals joining historically white denominations 
and traditions. About “one in three evangelicals in America today is Latino, Black, or 
Asian” (Burton 2018), and around two-thirds of these individuals oppose Trump’s 
immigration and refugee policies (Gorski 2017). These evangelicals of color are 
significantly more welcoming and more supportive of comprehensive immigration 
reform than white evangelicals (Burton 2018). This trend can also be seen by comparing 
white evangelicals to Black protestants. Black protestants and white evangelicals possess 
relatively similar theological beliefs. They both believe that the Bible is the word of God, 
they both believe that the acceptance of Jesus as savior is the only way to salvation, and 
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they also both believe in sharing their faith with others. However, 58 percent of Black 
protestants support allowing refugees into the country, compared to the 31 percent of 
white evangelicals (Newman 2018). In addition, while the theological beliefs of Black 
protestants and white evangelicals are quite similar, roughly 90% of them voted for 
Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, contrasting the 80% of white evangelicals who 
voted for Trump (Gorski 2017). As seen in Figure 1, 51 percent of white evangelical 
Protestants favor passing a law to prevent refugees from entering the U.S., compared to 
only 28 percent of Black Protestants and 35 percent of Hispanic Protestants. In addition, 
Figure 2 shows that 53 percent of white evangelical Protestants think that the growing 
number of newcomers from other countries threatens American customs and values, 
compared to only 31 percent of Black protestants and 23 percent of Hispanic Protestants. 
It is clear from the data that negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, which 
contradict the main teachings of Christianity, is a phenomenon that exclusively exists 
among white evangelical protestants, not evangelical protestants as a whole. 
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Figure 1. Refugee Attitudes Based on Religious Group 
 
https://www.prri.org/research/partisan-polarization-dominates-trump-era-findings-from-the-2018-
american-values-survey/ 
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Figure 2. Immigrant Attitudes Based on Religious Group 
 
https://www.prri.org/research/poll-immigration-reform-views-on-immigrants/ 
 
 
Theoretical Development 
Post-Obama Era 
 An existing theory that can explain white evangelical attitudes toward immigrants 
and refugees is the increasing influence of racial attitudes on politics as a result of the 
Obama presidency. Tesler (2016) argues that after Obama was elected as the first African 
American president in 2008, many thought the country was entering into a period of post-
racial politics. However, Americans ended up becoming even more racially polarized 
than before. In the years following the 2008 election, racial attitudes have come to 
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increasingly influence multiple aspects of political decision making (Tesler 2016). A few 
aspects of politics that Tesler specifically defines as being influenced by racial attitudes 
include public policy preferences and the expanding of the political divide between white 
and nonwhite Americans. Tesler uses various sets of data in each chapter to support his 
argument that racial attitudes have had increasing influence on American politics and 
political decision making since the 2008 election. The author uses data from the 2012 
American National Elections Study (ANES) to reveal how racial resentment during 
Obama’s presidency influenced support for government health insurance. Support for 
government health insurance among the most racially resentful white Americans was .4 
on a scale from 0 to 1 in 2008. In 2012, the end of Obama’s first term, the data shows it 
was predicted to drop to .2 (Tesler 2016). This data reveals how the Obama era 
strengthened pre-existing racial resentments and influenced white Americans’ support or 
opposition to certain policies.  
 The theory that the country is in an era of increasingly racialized politics due to 
the Obama presidency can be used to provide an argument that aids in explaining white 
evangelical attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. Individuals who already harbored 
hints of racist thinking prior to Obama’s presidency became even more polarized on 
racial issues after having an African American as president for 8 years. This argument 
that racial attitudes have had increasing influence on virtually all sectors of American 
politics since the 2008 election can be used to explain why white evangelicals possess 
negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, despite the fact that this very behavior 
explicitly contradicts the core values of Christianity. 
Group Identities – Partisanship  
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 Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2018) build upon the theory of increasingly racialized 
politics in the post-Obama era by arguing that salient group identities are what led to 
Trump winning the presidency. The theory that group identities were a driving factor in 
what caused Trump to win the election can be used to explain white evangelical attitudes 
towards immigrants and refugees, particularly since 2016. The authors argue that the state 
of the economy, the Obama presidency, and the demographics of the political parties, 
produced the unexpected outcome of the election (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). The 
authors assert that Trump’s victory was “foreshadowed by changes in the Democratic and 
Republican coalitions that were driven by people’s racial and ethnic identities” (Sides, 
Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). Trump’s campaign reinforced and exacerbated political 
differences by focusing on issues related to race, immigration, and religion. One of the 
group identities that the authors define as having particular importance is partisanship. 
The authors employ a number of graphs as data to support their argument that party was 
an influential factor in the outcome of the 2016 campaign and election. A graph showing 
favorability towards Muslims was taken from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which 
shows the different ratings of Muslims based on political party from 1992-2012 on a 
scale from -60 to 30. The graph clearly shows a higher approval rating of Muslims 
amongst the Democratic party than amongst the Republican party. In 2012, Democrats 
rated Muslims at 0, whereas Republicans rated them at -50 (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 
2018). A second piece of data used by the authors to support their argument of the 
influence of group identities on the 2016 campaign and election was a graph taken from 
the Pew Values Survey. This graph shows attitudes toward immigration restrictions based 
on party from 1992 – 2012 and was also placed on a scaled from -60 to 30. The 
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Democratic respondents showed a strong opposition towards immigration restrictions in 
2012 (+30), whereas the Republican respondents showed a strong support for 
immigration restrictions (-30) (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). These results support 
the authors’ argument for the influence of group identities by proving that attitudes 
surrounding certain policies and populations are associated with a particular partisanship. 
Diamond (1996) also argues for the importance of partisanship when it comes to attitudes 
toward certain populations. The author asserts that Republican politicians will focus on 
anti-immigrant themes, “especially when focused on ‘illegal’ immigration, because it is 
likely to be advantageous at the polls” (Diamond 1996, 166). The Republican party’s 
association with anti-immigrant policies has become so strong that Republican candidates 
cannot hope to reach election or reelection without aligning themselves with that same 
rhetoric. 
 This theory’s argument for the relevance of group identities can be used to 
provide a theoretical explanation for why white evangelicals, although their religion 
preaches compassion for the poor and the stranger, continue to perform politically on the 
basis of their group identities. The findings and arguments made by the authors can 
explain white evangelical negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees by arguing 
that it is partisanship that drives their political behavior, rather than their faith.  
White Racial Solidarity 
 Closely related to group identity politics is the theory that racial solidarity, or 
white identity, plays a significant role in explaining white evangelical attitudes towards 
immigrants and refugees. Jardina (2019) asserts that due to our country’s changing racial 
landscape, many whites have described themselves as “outnumbered, disadvantaged, and 
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even oppressed” (13). The United States is becoming increasingly diverse, and this trend 
can be seen through a number of recent developments, such as a growing non-white 
population, the anticipated loss of white majority status, and increasing political power 
among people of color (Jardina 2019). These political and cultural developments are now 
perceived as a threat to many white Americans. When the status quo of white privilege is 
challenged, it results in a sense of fear or anxiety among those who ascribe to that group. 
It is this perceived threat that has led to a sense of “commonality, attachment, and 
solidarity” with their racial group (Jardina 2019). This racial solidarity now plays a 
pivotal role in the ways that whites associate themselves on political and social issues, 
including a theoretical resistance to change (Smith 2010). The author empirically 
supports her claims using six primary sources spanning six years. These sources include 
survey questions to measure white identity as well as data from the American National 
Election Studies (ANES). One possible weakness of the author’s methods is that she is 
not always able to measure racial identity with the full range of appropriate questions. 
The author’s proposed measure of white identity comprises the following questions: how 
important is being white to your identity? To what extent do you feel that white people in 
this country have a lot to be proud of? How much would you say that whites in this 
country have a lot in common with one another?  
 White racial solidarity is the theory that when whites perceive that there is a threat 
to their way of life, their solidarity or attachment to their whiteness will become more 
salient. Once this solidarity takes root, it will then become a driving force in determining 
the political attitudes and decisions of those individuals. This theory of white racial 
solidarity can be used to explain white evangelical attitudes toward immigrants and 
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refugees. White evangelicals may continue to possess negative attitudes towards these 
populations because their white identity has become salient enough to reflect onto their 
political attitudes. Although these negative attitudes contradict the very teachings of their 
faith, they may continue to possess them due to the perception that these populations are 
a threat to their way of life, their idea of America, and their status quo.  
Nationalism 
 A theory that can explain white evangelical political attitudes towards immigrants 
and refugees is nationalism and pre-existing ideas of what it means to be an American. 
Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) argue for the importance of nationalism as a means to 
explain political behavior. The authors assert that understanding how Americans 
conceive their nation can provide insight into cultural motivations that influence political 
choices (Bonikowski, DiMaggio 2016). One of their data sets revealed that in 2004, 
respondents answered that the most important qualities to being “truly American” were 
“American citizenship, ability to speak English, feeling American, and ‘respecting 
America’s political institutions and laws’” (Bonikowski, DiMaggio 2016, 955). Similar 
to nationalism, Bean (2014) argues that visions of national solidarity “play a critical role 
in linking religious practice to political attitudes and civic engagement” (166). This 
vision of national solidarity in regard to white evangelicals most commonly includes the 
assertion that America was founded as a Christian nation, and that Christianity is the 
rightful foundation for an American identity (Bean 2014). Evangelicals who possess a 
vision of national solidary are more inclined to exclude individuals from membership in 
the nation if they are seen as a symbolic threat to this vision (Bean 2014). The author uses 
multi-sited ethnography to compare two evangelical congregations in the United States 
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and Canada, analyzing how evangelical congregations in the United States and Canada 
differently construct subcultural identity.  
 The theories of nationalism and national solidarity are relevant in determining 
white evangelical attitudes toward policies surrounding immigrants and refugees. A 
strong adherence to nationalism and visions of what it means to be an American can be 
used as plausible answers as to why white evangelicals continue to hold negative 
attitudes towards immigrants and refugees, despite their faith’s teachings of compassion 
and inclusivity. 
White Christian Nationalism 
 White Christian nationalism is a plausible theory that exists to explain white 
evangelical attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. Sherkat and Lehman (2018) assert 
that white Christian nationalism “plays a role in structuring negative views of immigrants 
and Muslims” (1791). Historically, for conservative protestants, a Christian America 
could only be achieved by making certain that “Catholics and non-Christians were 
prevented entry” (Sherkat and Lehman 2018, 1793). It was this belief that led to 19th 
century protestant anti-immigrant groups becoming quite powerful. These ideas of a 
Christian America have pervaded into modern day white evangelical ideas of who is 
worthy of being given the opportunity to become an American. The authors contend that 
white Christian nationalism has been embraced by biblical inerrantists and white 
evangelicals. The journal Christianity Today was in fact originally chosen to 
“demonstrate an evangelical perception of a proper, divinely ordained, American 
identity” (Vinz 1997, 13). For their research method, the authors utilize a choice-based 
conjoint design to obtain comprehensive data on citizens’ opinions about who to admit 
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into the country. The experiment puts respondents “in the position of immigration 
officials, asking them to make decisions between pairs of immigrants applying for 
admission” (Sherkat and Lehman 2018, 533). The data revealed that Americans were less 
likely to admit immigrants into the country who come from Muslim countries, who had 
never been to the United States before, and who don’t speak English. Individuals who are 
not Christian, such as Muslims, as well as individuals who come from a nation whose 
culture and ethnicity falls outside of the scope of the norms of white Christianity, go 
against the traditional view of a Christian America. It is because of this pervasive view of 
America being defined by its whiteness and its Christianity that individuals who come in 
the form of immigrants and refugees are often subject to opposition.  
 Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) contribute to a discussion about white Christian 
nationalism by analyzing how prejudice and ethnocentrism are tied to ideas of American 
identity. The authors assert that “native born white Americans are likely to be more 
supportive of immigrants from Europe” than immigrants from countries that are more 
ethnically and culturally distinctive (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015, 532). The authors 
also argue that a norms-based approach is relevant when analyzing ideas of American 
identity. Attitudes towards immigrants might thus “hinge on whether they are seen as 
upholding American norms” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015, 532). For example, “over 
90% of Americans indicate that speaking English is an important element of American 
identity” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 205, 532).  
 The theory of white Christian nationalism can be useful in an analysis of white 
evangelical attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. This theory explains how racial 
and religious visions of what America should ascribe to are what allow some white 
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evangelicals to oppose immigrants and refugees, instead of letting their faith be what 
allows them to support these populations. 
Class Culture 
 A theory that has been developed to explain white evangelical attitudes towards 
immigrants and refugees is class culture. Brint and Abrutyn (2010) argue that religious 
identity itself has little net impact on political attitudes, and that instead, “social 
circumstances and beliefs associated with particular religious memberships are the real 
underlying causes of political conservatism” (329). As economically vulnerable members 
of a dominant racial group, lower-income and less-educated whites are reluctant to 
change that could lead to greater opportunity for minorities (Brint and Abrutyn 2010). 
The authors’ study uses data from the 2000-2004 American National Election Studies 
(ANES) to compare five competing explanations of the relationship between religion and 
conservative political views in the United States. These explanations focused primarily 
on religiosity, moral standards traditionalism, gender and family ideology, class culture, 
and cultural geography. The class culture variables were measured according to three 
categories of differentiation; income level, managerial authority, and education (Brint and 
Abrutyn 2010). Moral standards traditionalism demonstrated the most consistent and the 
strongest effects across dependent variables, however, the researchers’ discussion of class 
culture is what can be useful in explaining white evangelical attitudes towards 
immigrants and refugees. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) also argue for the importance 
of class and economic concerns when attempting to explain attitudes towards immigrants 
and refugees. The authors assert that “the native-born perceive immigrants as competitors 
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for scarce jobs and will oppose immigrants if they have skill profiles and occupations 
similar to their own” (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015, 531).  
 The social circumstances of lower-class whites due to their economic standing 
can be used as a plausible explanation for white evangelical negative attitudes toward 
immigrants and refugees, despite the fact that it goes against Jesus’s teachings of 
compassion and open heartedness. White evangelicals who are from a lower economic 
class are more concerned about policies that promote their economic well-being than they 
are about policies that may provide opportunities for others, even if those policies are 
aligned with the foundations of their faith. 
 
Method 
 In order to answer this thesis’s research question, three hypotheses will be 
developed and tested. Hypotheses two and three will have two parts; part A will pertain to 
immigrant attitudes and part B will pertain to refugee attitudes. All data will be taken from 
two surveys conducted in 2018. The first is the 2018 Pew Research Center’s American 
Trends Panel. This Wave 32 survey was conducted between February 26 – March 11, 2018. 
The total number of respondents was 6,251. The second survey that will be used is the Pew 
Research Center May 2018 RBS/RDD Study Questionnaire. This study was conducted by 
phone call and took place between April 25 – May 1, 2018. The total number of respondents 
was 4,000. All data will be placed into five cross tab analyses for each of the five 
hypotheses and will specifically be coded to show responses from non-Latinx white 
evangelicals only. 
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 There are numerous possible reasons for why white evangelicals might contradict 
their faith by harboring negative attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. As discussed 
in the theoretical development, white identity can be one of the strongest predictors of 
white evangelical feelings toward newcomers to America. As Jardina (2019) argues, a 
salience in white racial identity often results in “an effort to maintain political, social, and 
economic systems under the control of the dominant group” (1361). White racial identity 
is also typically unified with a general blindness to the inherent privileges that are 
afforded to whites over racial minorities. In order to operationalize this theory, this thesis 
will utilize the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: If a white evangelical does not think that white people benefit from advantages in 
society, then they are more likely to think that immigrants threaten American values. 
 
 The independent variable for H1 is strength of white identity, and the dependent 
variable is likelihood of thinking that immigrants threaten American values. Strength of 
white identity will be measured by using data from a survey question asked in the 2018 
Pew Research Center American Trends Panel. Respondents were asked, how much, if at 
all, do white people benefit from advantages in society that black people do not have? 
Respondents answered from the following options; a great deal, a fair amount, not too 
much, or not at all. Respondents who think that white people do not benefit at all from 
advantages in society will rank high on strength of white identity. The dependent 
variable, likelihood of thinking that immigrants threaten American values, will be 
measured by using a survey question where respondents were asked, which statement 
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comes closer to your own views – even if neither is exactly right? Respondents answered 
from the following options; the growing number of newcomers from other countries 
threatens traditional American customs and values, or the growing number of newcomers 
from other countries strengthens American customs and values. White born-again 
evangelicals who have a higher strength of white identity are hypothesized to be more 
likely to respond by saying that the growing number of newcomers from other countries 
threatens traditional American customs and values. To prove this hypothesis, the data 
from the independent and dependent variables will be analyzed through a cross tab. 
 Many white evangelicals are disconnected with their faith and the stances that 
their religious leaders have taken on the issues of immigration and refugee intake. As 
discussed in this paper’s introduction, infrequent church attenders make up a large base 
of the white evangelicals who support Trump, whose main policy points have been about 
reducing the country’s immigrant and refugee intake. This trend leads to the theory that a 
disconnect with one’s faith and religious teachings will lead to the support of policies that 
contradict that very faith. In order to operationalize this theory, this research will use the 
following hypotheses:  
 
H2, A: The less often a white evangelical attends church, the more likely they are to think 
that immigrants threaten American values. 
H2, B: The less often a white evangelical attends church, the less likely they are to think 
the U.S. has a responsibility to accept refugees.  
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 The independent variable for H2, A is frequency of church attendance, and the 
dependent variable is likelihood of thinking that immigrants threaten American values. 
Both variables will be measured by using the 2018 Pew Research Center American 
Trends Panel. The data for frequency of church attendance will be measured by using the 
survey’s demographic profile variable codebook. Respondents were asked, aside from 
weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services? Respondents could 
then choose from options 1-6; more than once a week, once a week, once or twice a 
month, a few times a year, seldom, or never. It is hypothesized that the more frequent a 
white evangelical attends church, the less likely they are to think that immigrants threaten 
American values. This hypothesis will be proven by placing the data from each variable 
into a cross tab analysis. 
 The independent variable for H2, B is frequency of church attendance and the 
dependent variable is likelihood of thinking the U.S. has a responsibility to accept 
refugees. Both variables will be measured using data from the Pew Research Center May 
2018 RBS/RDD Study Questionnaire. The independent variable will be measured 
through the same survey question used to measure church attendance in H2,A. Likelihood 
of thinking the U.S. has a responsibility to accept refugees will be measured through the 
question which asked respondents, do you think the U.S. has a responsibility to accept 
refugees into the country, or do you think the U.S. does NOT have a responsibility to do 
this? Respondents who attend church less frequently are hypothesized to be more likely 
to think the U.S. does NOT have a responsibility to accept refugees. The data from each 
variable will be analyzed by placing them into a cross tab analysis. 
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 Economic interests represent another theory that exists to explain white 
evangelical attitudes toward immigrants and refugees. As previously mentioned in the 
theoretical development section of this paper, class culture represents the theory that 
economically vulnerable members of a dominant racial group will oppose opportunities 
for newcomers and racial minorities. Brint and Arbutyn (2010) argue that “relative 
powerlessness of lower-status whites leads to greater insecurity and hence heightened 
distrust of unfamiliar others” (331). This thesis will utilize the following hypotheses in 
order to operationalize this theory: 
 
H3, A: As the self-reported income of a white evangelical goes down, their likelihood of 
thinking that immigrants threaten American values goes up. 
H3, B: As the self-reported income of a white evangelical goes down, their likelihood of 
thinking the U.S. has a responsibility to accept refugees goes down. 
 
 The independent variable for H3, A is self-reported income and the dependent 
variable is likelihood of thinking immigrants threaten American values. Self-reported 
income will be measured using the demographic profile codebook for the 2018 Pew 
Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Respondents were asked, last year, what was 
your total family income from all sources, before taxes? Respondents answered from 
options 1-9; less than $10,000, $10,000 to less than $20,000, $20,000 to less than 
$30,000, $30,000 to less than $40,000, $40,000 to less than $50,000, $50,000 to less than 
$75,000, $75,000 to less than $100,000, $100,000 to less than $150,000, or $150,000 or 
more. It is hypothesized that as the self-reported income of a white evangelical goes 
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down, their likelihood of thinking immigrants threaten American values will go up. The 
data from each variable will be analyzed be placing them into a cross tab analysis. 
 The independent variable for H3, B is self-reported income and the dependent 
variable is likelihood of thinking the U.S. has a responsibility to accept refugees. The 
data for each variable will be taken from the Pew Research Center May 2018 RBS/RDD 
Study Questionnaire. The independent variable will be measured through the same survey 
question used to measure income in H3, A. It is hypothesized that respondents who have 
a lower self-reported income are more likely to think the U.S. does NOT have a 
responsibility to accept refugees. This research will seek to find empirical support for this 
hypothesis by placing the data from each variable into a cross tab analysis. 
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Results1 
 The results from Table 1 reveal that there is empirical support for a relationship 
between white identity and attitudes toward immigrants among white evangelicals. 
87.37% of respondents who said white people do not benefit at all from advantages in 
society thought that the growing numbers of newcomers threaten American values, 
whereas only 28.21% of respondents who said that white people benefit a great deal from 
advantages in society thought that newcomers threaten American values. This 
relationship is statistically significant through the P value (P < 0.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 All crosstab results were developed with the help of Dr. Kerem Kalkan, thesis mentor. 
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Table 1. White Identity and Immigrant Attitudes Among White Evangelicals 
 
 
 
  
 The results from Table 2 reveal that there is not empirical support for a 
relationship between worship attendance and immigrant attitudes among white 
evangelicals. H2, A hypothesized that the more often a white evangelical attends church, 
the more in tuned they would be with their faith, and therefore would be more likely to 
support immigrants. The data reveals that there is a constant trend of opposition toward 
  
How much, if at all, do white people benefit 
from advantages in society that black people do 
not have?  
  
 
Which statement comes 
closer to your own 
views? 
  
A great 
deal 
A fair 
amount 
Not too 
much 
Not at all Total 
 
The growing number of 
newcomers from other 
countries 
STRENGTHENS 
traditional American 
customs and values 
  
71.79% 47.76% 20.70% 12.63% 30.08% 
 
The growing number of 
newcomers from other 
countries THREATENS 
traditional American 
customs and values 
  
28.21% 52.24% 79.30% 87.37% 69.92% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Pearson chi2(3) = 137.47     P value = 0.000 
 
Source: 2018 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. 
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immigrants among white evangelicals regardless of frequency of church attendance, 
which is further shown through the P value (P < 0.828). 
 
Table 2. Worship Attendance and Immigrant Attitudes Among White Evangelicals 
 
 Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you 
attend religious services? 
 
 
Which 
statement 
comes 
closer to your 
own views?  
Never Seldom 
A few 
times a 
year 
Once or 
twice a 
month 
Once a 
week 
More 
than 
once a 
week 
Total 
 
The growing 
number of 
newcomers 
STRENGTHE
NS American 
customs and 
values 
  
22.22% 24.71% 30.93% 31.48% 31.52% 29.81% 30.14% 
 
The growing 
number of 
newcomers 
THREATENS 
American 
customs and 
values 
  
77.78% 75.29% 69.07% 68.52% 68.48% 70.19% 69.86% 
Total 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
Pearson chi2(5) =   2.1561   P value = 0.827 
Source: 2018 Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. 
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 The results from Table 3 reveal that there is not empirical support for a 
relationship between worship attendance and refugee attitudes. H2, B hypothesized that a 
greater frequency of church attendance would result in more favorable attitudes toward 
refugees. However, the data shows a pattern of negative attitudes toward refugees 
regardless of how often a white evangelical attends church. For example, 55.56% of 
respondents who never attend religious services outside of weddings and funerals oppose 
refugees, which is not far off from the 59.38% of those who attend services more than 
once a week. 
 
Table 3. Worship Attendance and Refugee Attitudes Among White Evangelicals 
 
  
Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend 
religious services? 
  
 
Do you 
think the 
U.S. has a 
responsibilit
y to accept 
refugees 
into the 
country?  
Never Seldom 
A few 
times a 
year 
Once or 
twice a 
month 
Once a 
week 
More 
than 
once a 
week 
Total 
YES 44.44% 35.29% 31.25% 19.35% 33.68% 40.62% 33.87% 
NO 55.56% 64.71% 68.75% 80.65% 66.32% 59.38% 66.13% 
Total 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
Pearson chi2(5) = 4.7840   P value = 0.443  
 
Source: Pew Research Center May 2018 RBS/RDD Study Questionnaire. 
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 Table 4 reveals that there is not empirical support for a relationship between 
income and immigrant attitudes among white evangelicals. H3, A hypothesized that 
white evangelicals who have a lower income will be less favorable toward policies that 
provide opportunities for newcomers, and therefore will be more likely to oppose 
immigrants.  These results show that there is still a trend of negative support for 
immigrants in America among white evangelicals regardless of self-reported income, 
which is further shown through the P value (P < 0.882). 
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Table 4. Income and Immigrant Attitudes Among White Evangelicals 
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 Lastly, the results in Table 5 reveal that there is not empirical support for a 
relationship between income and refugee attitudes among white evangelicals. H3, B 
hypothesized that when income goes down, support for refugees among white 
evangelicals will go down also. However, these results show that a higher income or a 
lower income makes no significant statistical difference in refugee attitudes among white 
evangelicals. Through these results, income is revealed to not be a significant driver of 
refugee attitudes, which can be further supported through the P value (P < 0.927). 
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Table 5. Income and Refugee Attitudes Among White Evangelicals 
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Discussion 
 This research’s findings revealed that there is empirical support for Hypothesis 1 
and the relationship between strength of white identity and attitudes toward newcomers to 
America. The data shown in Table 1 revealed that white evangelicals who do not think 
that they benefit from advantages in society are more likely to think that newcomers are a 
threat to American values. When whites believe that they are not afforded higher status 
based off the color of their skin, it means that they have a higher strength of white 
identity. These individuals are blind to the privilege that they have and perceive their 
placement in society as the status quo. Therefore, these individuals become more 
concerned when newcomers are offered opportunities in society because it leads to the 
perception that they are a threat to the privileges that they experience, but regard as 
normal. The results from hypotheses 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B showed some trends, but did 
not reveal statistically significant numbers. By analyzing the data from all hypotheses, the 
empirical claim can be made that white evangelicals contradict their faith by opposing 
immigrants and refugees, not because of infrequent worship attendance or because of 
economic concerns, but because of racially driven political interests. 
 There are a number of implications that can be made due to the results of this 
research. The first is the implication on future research and the importance of analyzing 
how white identity and perceptions of white privilege affect white evangelical political 
attitudes toward minority groups. Political and social scientists should seriously consider 
the influence that a culture of denying the reality of white privilege has on public support 
or opposition to certain policies. White identity can represent a critical factor in what 
drives policies that inherently harm racial minorities, such as building walls, separating 
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families, limiting refugees, and prohibiting migrants based on their religion. Future 
researchers can adequately explain white evangelical support for these policies and 
opposition toward the groups they target by analyzing perceptions of white privilege. 
 Another implication that can be made as a result of this research’s findings is that 
white evangelical leadership should openly and publicly recognize that there is an issue 
of race relations within their community. Proper and necessary steps toward racial 
reconciliation should be taken, rather than proclaiming racial justice on the outside while 
remaining apathetic within. Reconciliation cannot begin until there is an 
acknowledgement of white evangelicalism’s racist past (Heltzel 2009). Once this 
recognition has been made, the evangelical church can begin to reconcile by making 
room for more diverse leadership, reaching out to other religious communities of color, 
and holding their members accountable for opposing those in need.  
 The third implication of this research is that evangelicals and their church 
communities should take a more active role in the political advocacy for immigrants and 
refugees in this country. The evangelical church has the power to assert itself as an agent 
of social change (Sharp 2004), whether it be through protests, outreach to political 
representatives, the mobilization of their believers, or even the use of the word of God. 
No one who claims to be a follower of Jesus should remain silent when families are being 
forcible separated, when children are dying in U.S. custody, or when those escaping from 
war are denied refuge.  
Reflection 
 The social and political dynamic of the United States is evolving at a fast pace. 
The growing number of racial and ethnic minorities are changing the standard of what it 
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means to be an American. Political, social, and governmental systems and institutions are 
all experiencing an era of change to go along with the changing population. This change 
has been met with resistance from white Americans who perceive racial and ethnic 
minorities as a threat. White individuals, on average, receive “greater material benefits, 
social esteem, and political accommodation” (Jardina 2019, 41). When these privileges – 
ones that whites regard as natural – are challenged, “many whites react defensively, 
condemning and resisting changes to the racial status quo.” (Jardina, 2019, 41). This 
perception has been given the label strength of white identity. When it comes to political 
attitudes toward minority newcomers to the country, white evangelicals in the United 
States perform based off of this white racial identity, rather than based off of their faith. 
The reason why contradictions arise between the political behavior of white evangelicals 
and the teachings of their faith is because they are not basing their political views off of 
the teachings of Jesus, for if they did, they would overwhelmingly support pathways to 
citizenship for immigrants and they would overwhelmingly support refugee intake. 
However, the data continues to show that white evangelicals possess the lowest numbers 
of support for these very individuals. Despite the fact that the Bible says to “love those 
who are foreigners” and to “love your neighbor as yourself,” we see that white 
evangelicals are letting their racial insecurities be what allows them to exclude the 
foreigner, their neighbor, and those who are most at need (Deuteronomy 10:19, Matthew 
22:39, NIV). 
 Unfortunately, this trend of white evangelicals possessing negative attitudes 
toward minority groups is a pattern that has repeated itself throughout American history. 
Many evangelical protestants during the 1800s used Christianity to defend slavery. A 
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great number of white evangelicals during the Civil Rights Movement resisted efforts 
toward social and political progress for African Americans. There are countless stories of 
LGBTQIA+ individuals being mistreated and rejected by an evangelical church in the 
late 90s and early 2000s. Today, we see the same cycle of resistance and exclusion 
repeating itself with immigrants and refugees. It is always important to note that being a 
white evangelical does not implicitly mean that one harbors hostility toward minority 
groups. There have been numerous churches, organizations, religious leaders, and 
evangelical activists who have embodied the ideals of love and compassion for the 
world’s most oppressed peoples. However, the empirical significance of white 
evangelicals opposing immigrants and refugees is relevant to study and discuss in the 
uncertainness and polarization of today’s political climate. More importantly, these topics 
must continue to be discussed because the world and its most oppressed inhabitants can 
no longer afford to be overlooked by those who have the power to help them. It is time 
for the evangelical church and its members to step away from their legacy of racism, 
xenophobia, and exclusion, and make the long overdue strides toward the true meaning of 
Jesus; inclusion for the outcasted, compassion for the desperate, justice for the oppressed, 
and most importantly, love for all peoples. 
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